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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
KENNETH FRIEDMAN and VIR-
GINIA E. FRIEDMAN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
C. LESLIE WHEELER, JOHN H. 
TEMPEST and JOHN H. TEMPEST, 
JR., d.b.a. WHEELER & TEMPEST, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
8236 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Complaint 
The material allegations of plaintiffs' complaint are as 
follows: 
On or about November 19, 1951, there occurred an 
explosion in plaintiffs' residence located at 3100 South 
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1640 East Street, Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 1, 2). The 
explosion produced extensive damage to said residence (R. 
2) . As a direct and proximate result of the explosion oc-
curring, the plaintiff, Virginia E. Friedman, suffered fright 
and marked shock to her nervous system, which caused 
her continuing severe emotional and nervous upset in that 
she does not sleep well and is easily disturbed and upset 
(R. 4). 
The complaint alleges further that plaintiffs' residence 
was built in the year 1948; that the defendant, Wheeler 
& Tempest, under a Salt Lake County permit, issued May 
19, 1948, excavated near said residence for and on behalf 
of the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, and 
assisted the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
in the installation of the necessary pipes and mains to 
supply gas to plaintiffs' residence; that the defendant, 
Byron W. Lundberg, or the defendant, Barney A. Todd, 
or both of them, excavated and installed a water line in 
plaintiffs' residence under a Salt Lake County permit dated 
June 21, 1948, and that said excavation and waterline in-
stallation were made adjacent and against the gas line 
installed by the defendants, Mountain Fuel Supply Com-
pany and Wheeler & Tempest (R. 2). The complaint charges 
that the defendants are liable to plaintiffs for the damages 
resulting from the explosion on the grounds that the de-
fendants and each of them performed the work of installing 
said gas and waterlines in a negligent manner so that 
natural gas was permitted to escape into plaintiffs' resi-
dence other than in the mains and lines intended for that 
purpose, and that said explosion was the result of gas hav-
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ing seeped into the basement of said residence and being 
ignited by the flame of the pilot light of either the gas water 
heater or furnace (R. 2, 3). Plaintiffs also claim that 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company failed and neglected to 
maintain said gas line and main in a proper and safe con-
dition so that gas could not escape therefrom and enter 
into the residence of plaintiffs other than in pipes installed 
and intended for that purpose (R. 3). 
Facts Established by the Evidence 
The material facts established by the evidence in this 
case are without substantial controversy. They are as fol-
lows: 
On November 19, 1951, at a few minutes past 10:00 
o'clock a. m. an explosion occurred in the basement of the 
house owned by plaintiffs, located at 3100 South 1640 East 
in Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 143, 144, 222). The explo-
sion caused substantial damage to the house (R. 152). 
However, the explosion did not disturb the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Friedman, from the position in which she was sitting in the 
living room at the time of the explosion (R. 145). In sup-
port of Mrs. Friedman's claim for personal injuries, she 
testified to only nervousness, loss of appetite, inability to 
sleep well and putting on weight at the rate of about two 
pounds a day. She was able, however, to take care of her 
normal household duties and her children (R. 147, 148, 
149). 
An investigation to determine the cause of the explo-
sion was made by employees of the defendant, Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, who arrived at the Friedman resi-
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dence within less than an hour after the explosion; and by 
W. L. Butler, mechanical engineer for Salt Lake City Cor-
poration, who arrived there shortly following the arrival 
of the gas company employees (R. 222, 440). 
When the employees of the gas company arrived at 
the scene of the explosion, bubbles were coming up through 
a puddle of water at the side of the blacktop in the street 
in front of the Friedman residence (R. 222). Also, a strong 
odor of gas coming through the water meter box was not-
iceable (R. 223). 
An excavation was made to uncover a portion of the 
gas main running north and south in the street in front 
and to the east of the Friedman residence (R. 224), which 
disclosed the following : The gas main had a kink in it; 
"It had been pulled to the east and upward-to the east 
about six inches-and upward about three or four inches 
out of the straight line" (R. 224). The gas main was lo-
cated a foot above and about the same distance west of a 
parallel water main (R. 235-236). The gas main was 
cracked where it had been kinked and the kink was located 
just above where the water service line to the Friedman 
residence was connected to the water main in the street 
(R. 244, plaintiffs' Exhibit 33, which is a section of the 
gas main in question showing the kink and crack). At the 
point of the kink there were gouges which were made by 
the impact of a great force (R. 246-247 and plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 33) . 
The testimony as to the immediate cause of the explo-
sion and the investigation made to determine the same was 
given by Mervin A. Cook, Professor of Metallurgy at the 
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University of Utah, D. J. Robison, Assistant Superinten-
dent of Distribution for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
and W. L. Butler, Mechanical Engineer for Salt Lake City 
Corporation. Mervin A. Cook testified that, in the after-
noon of the day following the explosion, he made a thorough 
investigation of the conditions that existed in the basement 
and around the house, and so forth, to determine what 
was the cause of the explosion (R. 174). 
The investigation made by said witnesses disclosed that 
gas had escaped from a break in the gas main in the street 
in front of plaintiffs' residence and from there had mi-
grated to and through the walls of plaintiffs' house into 
the basement thereof (R. 190-191, 249, 254, 444-446, 449, 
450, 463, 464). The investigation made by said witnesses 
covered among other things, the gas furnace, gas water 
heater, gas service line, gas meter and gas regulator, none 
of which showed any damage or leakage (R. 199, 206, 208, 
209, 240, 244, 254, 279-280, 417, 420, 422, 423, 435, 438, 
451, 453, 455). The only conflict in the evidence, which 
conflict is immaterial, is whether the gas escaping from 
the break in the gas main entered the basement at the 
north end of the east basement wall as testified to by Butler 
and Robison, or entered at the south end of said wall 
through a crack in the cement near the gas service line as 
testified to by Cook (R. 175-176, 178, 188, 206-208, 223, 
224, 237-238, 239, 240, 249, 450, 463). 
The section of the gas main in which the break oc-
curred (plaintiffs' Exhibit 33) was installed by the de-
fendant, Wheeler & Tempest, during the month of February, 
1948 (R. 140, 141, 287). It was a two-inch, new, wrapped, 
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steel pipe with an estimated life expectancy in service of 
about one hundred years and capable of holding a pressure 
of 600 to 800 pounds per square inch, but to be used to 
carry gas having a pressure of only 25 to 35 pounds per 
square inch. It was installed with the highest degree of 
care, in excellent condition and carefully tested for leakage 
before being covered (R. 366-370, 382-388, 399-403). The 
uncontradicted evidence shows that the gas main when in-
stalled by Wheeler & Tempest was "perfectly straight", 
"was laid in perfect condition", and was not kinked as 
shown by respondents' Exhibit 33 (R. 368, 370, 37 4, 379, 
388, 402, 403). In view of the verdict in favor of the de-
fendant, Wheeler & Tempest, it is conclusively established 
that the gas main was properly installed, and that the kink 
therein from which the break resulted cannot be attributed 
to any negligence on the part of either Wheeler & Tempest 
or l\1ountain Fuel Supply Company (R. 45, 101, 104, 105, 
107, 108). 
Under the evidence, it is indisputable that the break in 
the gas main resulted from a kink therein produced by a 
heavy blow which weakened the pipe and caused it to break 
open suddenly within a matter of hours prior to the 
explosion (R. 246, 247, 273, 274, 282, 304, 306, 308, 310-
311, 313, 315, 446-447, 460, 467, 468, 469). 
Since the installation of the gas main was completed 
and until the investigation following the explosion, Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company had had no occasion to excavate 
said gas main (R. 248) and it is established by stipulation 
that since the installation of the gas line until the time of 
the explosion, the only excavation in the vicinity of said 
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line was made by the defendants, Byron W. Lundberg and 
Barney A. Todd in laying a water service line to plaintiffs' 
house between June 21, 1940, and July 8, 1948 (R. 288, 
317). All the evidence points directly to the fact that the 
gas main was struck and kinked by a mechanical digger, 
known as a back-hoe, while digging the trench for said 
water service line (R. 246-248, 294, 297, 298, 311, 313, 325, 
333, 490, 494). The defendants, Lundberg and Todd and 
the witnesses produced by them were evasive and never 
directly denied that such was the fact (R. 294, 319, 320, 
322, 327, 504-506, 511, 512, 517). 
The evidence is conclusive that Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company had no notice of any leak in its line nor any op-
portunity to have learned of the same prior to the explo-
sion (R. 176, 192, 199, 270, 282, 283, 308, 310, 460, 467, 
468). ~/Irs. Friedman testified that she had never detected 
the odor of gas prior to the explosion (R. 149). All the 
witnesses, including those sponsored by plaintiffs, testi-
fied that the break in the line occurred suddenly and within 
a matter of hours prior to the explosion (R. 270, 282, 283, 
460, 467, 468). It is apparent from plaintiffs' Exhibit 33 
that a large quantity of gas was escaping from the broken 
main. Professor Cook, plaintiffs' witness, testified that 
the gas accumulated in the basement of said house rapidly 
-within less than a half hour-before the occurrence of 
the explosion (R. 176, 192, 199). 
Proceedings Following Close of Evidence 
At the close of all of the evidence, the defendant, Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company, moved for a directed verdict 
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(R. 519). The case was submitted to the jury which re-
turned a verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
for general and special damages and for damages to Mrs. 
Friedman. The jury returned separate verdicts in favor 
of the other defendants (R. 43-50). Following the recep-
tion of the verdict, the defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company, pursuant to Rule 50 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, moved to have the verdict against it and 
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment 
entered in accordance with its motion for a directed ver-
dict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial (R. 120-121). 
The trial court denied each of said motions (R. 128). There-
after, the appellant duly perfected an appeal from the 
judgment entered in this case (R. 130-136). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The verdict of the jury and the judgment entered 
thereon against appellant is not supported by the record 
in this case or anY substantial evidence therein, and the 
trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendant, 
l\iountain Fuel Supply Company, for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
2. The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion 
for a new trial. 
{a) The trial court erred in instructing the jury to 
the prejudice of the appellant. 
(b) The trial court erred in precluding appellant 
from proving its second defense to respondents' complaint. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1 
THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED THEREON AGAINST 
APPELLANT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE OR ANY SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE THEREIN AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
OF THE DEFENDANT, MOUNTAIN FUEL 
SUPPLY COMPANY, FOR JUDGMENT NOT-
WITHSTANDING TI-IE VERDICT. 
The controlling principles of law in ruling on a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict have been stated 
in the following cases recently decided by this court: 
In Jackson v. Colston et al., 116 Utah 288, 209 P. 2d 
566, the court states the law as follows: 
"The only question here to be decided is whether 
the court erred in directing a verdict for the defen-
dants. It is fundamental that the burden rests upon 
the plaintiff to establish the causal connection be-
tween the injury and the alleged negligence of the 
defendant: Tremelling v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 
Utah 189, 170 P. 80; that the court may not permit 
the jury to speculate concerning defendants' liabil-
ity; Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 
Utah 76, 75 P. 2d 660; and that the court is re-
quired to direct a verdict unless there is evidence 
from which the jury could reasonably find in favor 
of the plaintiff." 
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In Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., (Utah), 239 P. 2d 
17 4, the court held : 
"We have no disagreement with the time-hon-
ored rule that if there is substantial evidence to 
support the conclusion of the trier of the fact it will 
not be disturbed on review. But that means more 
than a mere scintilla of evidence. See 9 Wigmore, 
3d Ed., Sec. 2494, for a discussion of the test to be 
applied to the quantum of evidence necessary to 
support a finding by the trier of facts. In that sec-
tion, at page 296, he says, 'There was an old phrase 
that a mere scintilla of evidence was sufficient; but 
this has been abandoned by most courts.' Citing a 
plethora of cases. After referring to a variety of 
methods of phrasing the rule and a great many au-
thorities, he concludes the section with this: 'Per-
haps the best statement of the test is: Are there 
facts in evidence which if unanswered would justify 
men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming 
the question which the plaintiff is bound to main-
tain.' We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wig-
more. If there is any substantial competent evidence 
upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could make the finding, it should stand. But if the 
finding is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the 
court that no jury acting fairly and reasonably could 
make the finding, it cannot be said to be supported 
by substantial evidence. See also 20 Am. Jur. 1033." 
In Boskovich v. Uta.h Const. Co., (Utah), 259 P. 2d 
885, this court held : 
"It is fundamental that where there is no evi-
dence upon a material part of the plaintiff's claim, 
it is the court's duty to direct a verdict." 
The claims stated in the complaint upon which plain-
tiffs seek relief from the Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
are that the work of installing the gas line in question was 
performed in a negligent manner so that natural gas was 
permitted to escape into plaintiffs' residence and also that 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company failed and neglected to 
maintain said gas line and main in proper and safe con-
dition so that gas could not escape therefrom and enter 
into the residence of plaintiffs. In support of said claims, 
plaintiffs introduced into evidence a section of the gas 
main in front of plaintiffs' residence which showed a kink 
and break therein as the same existed at the time of the 
explosion (Exhibit 33). The gas line in question was in-
stalled for Mountain Fuel Supply Company by Wheeler & 
Tempest who were independent contractors with many 
years of experience in the installation of gas and other 
utility lines. Although it be conceded that any negligence 
of Wheeler & Tempest in making such installation would 
be imputable to Ivlountain Fuel Supply Company, it is now 
conclusively established in this case by the verdict in favor 
of Wheeler & Tempest that the gas line was not negligently 
installed. It is also established by the record in this case 
that the kink and resulting crack in the main, as shown 
by Exhibit 33, which permitted gas to escape and seep into 
plaintiffs' basement were caused by a heavy blow inflicted 
subsequent to its installation by persons other than the 
defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company. 
As pointed out under the statement of facts, the pipe-
line in question was new pipe which was installed by 
Wheeler & Tempest with the highest degree of care. It is 
undisputed that, but for the damage inflicted to the pipe 
by a person or persons other than Mountain Fuel Supply 
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Company, it would not have ruptured and permitted the 
escape of gas. Professor Mervin B. Hogan, head of the 
Department of Mechanical Engineering at the University 
of Utah, who was sponsored by and testified in behalf of 
plaintiffs, stated that in his judgment the break in the pipe 
was caused by the impact of some metallic body which 
made the kink in the pipe (R. 315). He testified: 
"Q. Now, the situation which you describe as 
to the traffic over the street, and so forth, that has 
relation to the fact that this pipe has been damaged 
by some blow ; is that correct? 
"A. Oh, yes, sir; yes, without that damage, 
there would be no stress concentration. 
"Q. Yes; and, if-you have examined the pipe? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And, if the ·pipe hadn't been damaged, you 
wouldn't expect that to have happened? 
"A. I am sure it wouldn't" (R. 310-311). 
The record, without conflict, shows that Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company had no notice of the leak in or of the dam-
aged condition of the gas main until its investigation fol-
lowing the explosion. Mrs. Friedman testified that she had 
not at any time prior to this explosion detected the odor of 
gas (R. 149). Both plaintiffs' and defendants' witnesses 
testified, without conflict, that the rupture in the gas main 
which permitted gas to escape occurred suddenly and within 
a few hours prior to the time of the explosion; thus, no 
opportunity was afforded the gas company to have dis-
covered and repaired the damage to the ruptured pipe. 
According to Professor Hogan, the blow and resulting kink 
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in the pipe resulted in an area of stress which eventually 
caused it to suddenly rupture or "flip open" (R. 308-310). 
Mr. Robison and Mr. Butler, who testified on the subject, 
stated that the break in the pipe would have occurred within 
a matter of hours prior to the explosion (R. 270, 467, 468). 
Howsoever the evidence may be viewed, the record in 
this case is conclusive that the gas line in question was 
properly installed, and that the break in the line which 
permitted gas to escape into plaintiffs' residence was caused 
by damage to the same inflicted subsequent to its installa-
tion by the negligent acts of a person or persons other than 
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company. The evidence all 
points to the fact that the kink in the line that eventually 
resulted in the break was caused by the impact of a me-
chanical digger which, subsequent to the installation of the 
gas main, was used to excavate a trench for the installation 
of the water service line to plaintiffs' residence. 
The record shows, therefore, that plaintiff not only 
failed to produce any substantial evidence of an act or 
omission on the part of Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
which proximately caused the injuries complained of, but 
that such injuries were proximately caused by the negli-
gent act of some third party or parties. 
Appellant's motion for a directed verdict specifically 
called the trial court's attention to the proposition that the 
plaintiff, Virginia E. Friedman, could not recover upon 
her claim set forth in the third count of the complaint, be-
cause the evidence showed that her alleged damages were 
based solely on fright and mental disturbances unaccom-
panied or preceded by physical injury (R. 519). 
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The testimony of Mrs. Friedman with respect to her 
claimed damages is as follows: That she was sitting in the 
living room at the time of the explosion (R. 144-145) ; that 
the explosion did not disturb her from the position in which 
she was sitting (R. 145) ; that after the explosion she be-
came extremely nervous, was not able to eat very well, 
couldn't sleep, and started putting on weight at about the 
rate of 2 pounds per day (R. 147). She testified ~hat this 
condition continued for about three weeks (R. 148). 
The applicable rule is concisely stated in 15 Am. Jur., 
Section 189, at Page 608, as follows: 
"Generally, however, no recovery can be had for 
fright alone caused by a negligent act which is 
neither accompanied nor followed by physical in-
jury. In other words, mere fright alone cannot be 
made the basis of an action for damages, unless 
caused by the willful wrong of another." 
In State v. Baltimore Transit Company, 80 A. 2d 13, 
28 A. L. R. 1061, the court held that damages for mental 
distress in connection with an injury to property is not re-
coverable in an action for the property tort. Following this 
case is an exhaustive annotation on the subject of "Recovery 
for mental shock or distress in connection with injury to 
or interference with tangible property". 28 A. L. R. 2d 
1070-1104. 
POINT NO.2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Our principal point is that the judgment entered on 
the verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company is not 
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supported by the record in this case or any substantial 
evidence therein, and that the trial court erred in denying 
appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict. However, as provided by Rule 50 (a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant prayed that, if its mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be denied, 
appellant be granted a new trial. The argument which 
follows is directed at the court's denial of said motion. 
(a) The trial court erred in instructing the jury to 
the prejudice of appellant. 
The trial court gave certain instructions to the jury 
under which they were required to make findings as to 
~ facts which were not in issue, nor supported by any sub-
' :~. stantial evidence. It is well settled that to so instruct is 
prejudicial error as it permits a jury to return a verdict 
based on speculation. The instructions complained of are 
the following: 
Instructions 13, 19 and 20 present to the jury an issue 
of fact as to whether Mountain Fuel Supply Company had 
furnished defective pipe for installation by Wheeler & 
Tempest (R. 99, 105, 106). The complaint makes no such 
claim. The negligence charged under the complaint is : 
"That the defendants and each of them per-
formed the work of installing said services in a care-
less and negligent manner, so that natural gas was 
permitted to escape into plaintiffs' residence * * * 
and that the negligent and careless manner in which 
defendants and all of them caused said line to be 
installed was the direct and proximate cause of said 
explosion and the resultant damage" (R. 2, 3). 
The record contains no evidence that the pipeline, as 
originally furnished to Wheeler & Tempest, was defective. 
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The uncontradicted evidence is to the contrary (R. 228, 
230, 244-246, 347, 348, 366-370, 382-388, 399-403). ,More-
over, it is established by plaintiffs' own witness, who had 
examined the pipe in question, that the sole cause of the 
break in the main was its obvious damaged condition re-
sulting subsequent to its installation and without which it 
would not have ruptured and permitted the escape of gas 
(R. 310-311). 
Instructions 12, 14 and 20 directed that the jury re-
turn a verdict against Mountain Fuel Supply Company if 
said Company had failed to use ordinary care in inspecting 
and maintaining its gas line prior to the explosion. This 
instruction is unsupported by any evidence in the record. 
The undisputed evidence is to the contrary : As herein-
above pointed out, the sole cause of the break in the pipe 
was a kink made in it by the impact of a heavy force oc-
curring subsequent to its intallation by the act of a person 
or persons other than appellant, and, undoubtedly, by the 
operator of a mechanical digger who was digging a trench 
for the installation of water service line to plaintiffs' resi-
dence. 
Respondents' witness, Professor Hogan testified: 
"Q. I understood you to say, Doctor, that the 
blow could cause the kink right at the place where 
the break is? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And there is evidence of marks that, that 
might have come from a tooth on a power shovel, is 
that right? 
"A. It would be my opinion, that is true, yes 
sir" (R. 313). 
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Respondents' complaint does not claim that appellant 
had notice of said damage done to its pipe or the leak 
thereafter resulting therefrom. It is uncontradicted that 
appellant had no such notice. Furthermore, under the evi-
dence it is clear that no reasonable care on appellant's part 
could have prevented the escape of gas from its main and 
the resulting explosion because, as testified to by both re-
spondents' and appellant's witnesses, the rupture in the 
pipe occurred suddenly and within a very short time prior 
to the explosion. 
Mr. W. L. Butler, an independent witness, who for 
many years has been the mechanical engineer for Salt Lake 
City Corporation, testified concerning this subject as fol-
lows: 
."Q. For the Gas Company. You have an opin-
ion as to how soon before the explosion this break 
occurred? 
"A. Yes, I have an opinion. I couldn't-! don't 
think anyone could be definite on their opinion. 
"Q. I understand, of course, we are· surmising 
in all things, that is; how soon before the explosion 
occurred would you estimate this break was present 
-occurred? 
"A. I would think within, safely, within 24 
hours. 
"Q. 24 hours? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. You think it would take 24 hours for gas, 
under 25-pound pressure, to force its way up through 
three feet of concrete sufficient to create a bubbling 
and a pool of water? 
"A. It wasn't concrete. 
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"Q. Through ground, I am sorry. No evidence 
of concrete, of course. 
"A. No, it wouldn't take that long to force it 
up there. It probably would be apparent there, de-
pending on the soil, the condition of the soil, maybe 
. in an hour or less. 
"Q. You think it would take an hour? 
"A. But that wasn't my opinion. My opinion 
was, how long maximum time elapsed between the 
break and the explosion. 
"Q. Well, that is what I asked you; you said 
24 hours, didn't you? 
"A. I would say within 24 hours would be my 
opinion. 
"Q. Is it possible, in your opinion, that this 
break, as it is now indicated and as you saw it when 
it was excavated, could have been open to that de-
gree and it would take 24 hours for that explosion 
to occur-
"A. Yes, what-
"Q. (Continued) -before-
" A. I don't say it was 24 hours. I say within 
24 hours. It could have been within an hour-the 
maximum time would be. 
"Q. Yes, I understand you don't think this is 
a gradual process; you don't think this pipe opened 
just a tiny bit, and within 24 hours, expanded to its 
present position? 
"A. I think the straining was a gradual pro-
cess and it finally reached the maximum that that 
side of the pipe could be strained and opened. 
"Q. You mean causing the ultimate break? 
"A. Yes" (R. 467-468). 
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Instruction 19 is clearly erroneous because it directs 
that the jury may return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, 
Virginia E. Friedman, for "personal injury damage * * *" 
and "for such mental suffering which said plaintiff has 
endured". There was no claim or evidence whatever of any 
physical injury to Mrs. Friedman. She testified to only 
fright and mental disturbance. As hereinabove pointed out, 
this was no basis for recovery in this action. 
(b) The trial court erred in precluding appellant 
from proving its second defense to respondents' complaint. 
Appellant's answer pleads the following defense to 
respondents' complaint: 
"Second Defeme 
"This defendant is informed and believes, and 
therefore alleges, that the Westchester Fire Insur-
ance Company of Illinois was prior to the institu-
tion of this action and now is the owner of the claim 
and cause of action sued upon herein jointly by the 
plaintiffs, Kenneth Friedman and Virginia E. Fried-
man and that said Westchester Fire Insurance Com-
pany is the real party in interest to prosecute such 
claim and action and is an indispensable party there-
to" (R. 12). 
Said defense is based on Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which reads as follows: 
"Even/ action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest; but an executor, ad-
ministrator, guardian, trustee of an express trust, 
a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in his own name with-
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out joining with him the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so pro-
vides, an action for the use or benefit of another 
shall be brought in the name of the State of Utah." 
Prior to the trial of this case, respondents moved to 
strike said defense as follows : 
"Come now the plaintiffs above named and move 
the court for an order striking the Second Defense 
appearing in the answer of the defendant, Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, on the ground and for the 
reason that said Second Defense is immaterial and 
upon the further ground that facts are not stated 
therein sufficient to constitute a defense to plain-
tiffs' action" (R. 24). 
Said motion was argued before the Honorable A. H. 
Ellett, one of the judges of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, who ordered that said motion to strike be denied 
(R. 28). At the trial of this cause before the Honorable 
Martin M. Larson, the following proceedings occurred : 
"MR. HENDERSON: The defendant, Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company, makes proffer of proof 
of its second defense, which is based on Rule 17 A 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides· that every action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest, and would make 
such proof except as otherwise precluded by the 
ruling of this court. And do I understand, your 
Honor, that you would sustain objection to that? 
"THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. HENDERSON: To such proof? 
"THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. HANSON: \Ve object to it, of course. 
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"THE COURT: The offer of proof made by 
the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, defendant, with 
regard to its second defense, as set up in its answer, 
is denied, and refused by the court, the objection 
thereto sustained, the court taking the view that 
the \\7 estchester Fire Insurance Company of Illinois, 
while it may be a proper or allowable party in the 
action-that is, could have been made a party to 
the action-is not a necessary or indispensible party 
to the action, and the matters involved in the second 
defense are not, in the court's view, a proper and 
effective defense to the action, and such matters 
would be irrelevant and immaterial" (R. 139). 
In National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. 
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 Pacific 653, the court pointed out that 
the former code section from which Rule 17 (a) was taken 
differed from the codes of several other states, and that 
said provision is most sweeping in its terms. The court 
held in discussing the remedies of a defendant in raising 
the defense provided for under said rule that, if it does 
not appear upon the face of the complaint that there is 
another party interested in the subject of the action, the 
objection may be taken by answer. The ruling in said case 
was approved in the case of Bank of American Fork v. 
Smith, 44 Utah 284, 140 P. 122. 
We submit that the ruling of the trial court in preclud-
ing appellant from proving said defense in effect abrogates 
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
The jury's verdict and the judgment entered thereon 
are not supported by the record made in this case. If the 
judgment against appellant is permitted to stand, the ap-
pellant will be required to respond in damages caused from 
no fault on its part, but from the acts committed by a per-
son or persons other than appellant. 
We also have assigned as error the court's denial of 
appellant's alternate motion for a new trial on the grounds 
that the trial court committed prejudicial error in instruct-
ing the jury and in precluding appellant from proof of its 
second defense to respondents' complaint. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that justice in 
this case requires the judgment entered on the verdict 
against appellant be set aside and judgment be entered in 
favor of appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, RAWLINS, JONES 
& HENDERSON, 
1011 Walker B~nk Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and B. Z. KASTLER, 
36 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Appellant, Moun-
tain Fuel Supply Company. 
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